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Security Assurance Cases (SAC) are structured bodies of arguments and
evidence used to reason about security properties of a certain artefact. SAC
are gaining focus in the automotive domain as the need for security assurance
is growing due to software becoming a main part of vehicles. Market demands
for new services and products in the domain require connectivity, and hence,
raise security concerns. Regulators and standardisation bodies started recently
to require a structured for security assurance of products in the automotive
domain, and automotive companies started, hence, to study ways to create and
maintain these cases, as well as adopting them in their current way of working.
In order to facilitate the adoption of SAC in the automotive domain, we
created CASCADE, an approach for creating SAC which have integrated quality
assurance and are compliant with the requirements of ISO/SAE-21434, the
upcoming cybersecurity standard for automotive systems.
CASCADE was created by conducting design science research study in
two iterative cycles. The design decisions of CASCADE are based on insights
from a qualitative research study which includes a workshop, a survey, and
one-to-one interviews, done in collaboration with our industrial partners about
the needs and drivers of work in SAC in industry, and a systematic literature
review in which we identified gaps between the industrial needs and the state
of the art.
The evaluation of CASCADE was done with help of security experts from
a large automotive OEM. It showed that CASCADE is suitable for integration
in industrial product development processes. Additionally, our results show
that the elements of CASCADE align well with respect to the way of working
at the company, and has the potential to scale to cover the requirements and
needs of the company with its large organization and complex products
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Security is gaining more focus in safety-critical domains since more connectivity
is needed in the services and products offered by companies in these domains.
In automotive, software has become a main part of vehicles and the need
for connectivity is essential to meet the market demands for functionalities
and services the vehicles offer, e.g., mobile phone connectivity and navigation
services. This has raised an issue when it comes to security assurance, i.e.,
answering the question “how do we make sure and prove that our product is
secure?”. This becomes an even larger issue the more complex the systems
become, consisting of multiple sub-systems with many stakeholders involved,
e.g., different providers for different parts.
Regulators and standardisation bodies recently started to require a struc-
tured way of security assurance for automotive products and processes. For this
reason, Security Assurance Cases (SAC) were specifically required in ISO/SAE-
21434 [1] to prove security conformance. Automotive companies started, hence,
to study ways to create and maintain these cases, as well as adopting them in
their current way of working. Assurance cases in general are not new to the au-
tomotive industry, as companies are already familiar with similar cases created
for safety (safety cases), which are required by ISO-26262 [2] for functional
safety for road vehicles. This opens up opportunities for knowledge transfer
from the safety domain into the security domain. However, this knowledge
transfer should be done cautiously and consider the differences between the
two domains.
In this work, we created CASCADE, an approach for creating SAC which
are compliant with the requirements of ISO/SAE-21434 and have integrated
quality assurance. CASCADE is based on insights from two studies: one done
in collaboration with our industrial partners about the needs and drivers of
work in SAC in industry and one systematic literature review in which we
identified gaps between the industrial needs and the state of the art.
As a first step, we identified and studied different factors that would drive
the work with security cases in the automotive domain. We studied internal
drivers, i.e., the requirements and needs from within an automotive company.
We identified thirteen different scenarios in which SAC can be used. These
scenarios spread over the entire life-cycle of automotive products and involve
many different roles in automotive companies. These scenarios also imposed
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additional requirements on SAC. E.g., the quality assurance of a SAC is essential
in order for it to be useful in industry.
External drivers that impose constraints of how SAC should look like were
identified by our partners at industry. This was done analyzing how SAC were
referenced in different documents (regulations, standards and best practices) in
the three major automotive markets (EU, US, and China). Thirteen documents
where SAC was either explicitly or implicitly required, or would assist to fulfill
the requirements of the documents were identified.
Based on what we learned about the internal and external needs for SAC in
automotive, we conducted a systematic literature review to examine whether
these needs are covered in literature or not. We systematically reviewed litera-
ture and looked for different characteristics, e.g., usage scenarios, approaches
for creating SAC, and tool support. In analysing our results, we made mul-
tiple observations. Most importantly, we saw a wide variety of approaches
for creating SAC, but none of them considers actual constraints and needs
from the automotive domain. We also observed a lack of quality assurance
of SAC in the reviewed literature. Another observation we made is the wide
range of potential benefits of SAC that was reported. However, there was a
gap between the internal needs identified at the automotive company, and the
usages suggested in literature.
For all the reasons above, we designed our own approach for SAC creation
based on what we learned from industry and literature. We focused on two
main aspects:
• Align the requirements and work products of the upcoming standard
ISO/SAE-21434 and the SAC (the outcome of the approach).
• Integrate quality within the cases themselves.
CASCADE, is an asset driven approach for creating security assurance cases
with built-in quality assurance. We illustrated the approach using an example
use case from ISO/SAE-21434 and evaluated it with help of security experts at
a large automotive OEM. The evaluation showed that CASCADE is suitable
for integration in industrial product development processes. The elements
of CASCADE align well with respect to the way of working at the company.
Additionally, CASCADE has the potential to scale to cover the requirements
and needs of the company with its large organization and complex products.
1.1 Research Focus
This research work is motivated by the observation that SAC are becoming
important in the safety critical domain, in particular, companies in the automo-
tive industry.The main goal of this research is “to support practitioners in the
automotive domain to make go/no go decisions of the release of their products
from a security point of view, with the help of security assurance cases”. To
achieve this overall goal, we addressed the following goals in this licentiate
thesis:
• Goal 1: to understand the specific needs concerning SAC in the auto-
motive domain.
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• Goal 2: to understand the state of the art about SAC in literature.
• Goal 3: to create and assess an approach for creating SAC taking into
consideration the specific needs of the automotive domain.
To reach the goals of this thesis, we formulate the following research ques-
tions:
RQ1: What are the drivers for working with security assurance cases in the
automotive domain?
This question addresses the emergence of several standards and regulations
that are forcing the industry to develop a methodology for SAC in order
to stay compliant and avoid legal risks. We call these the external drivers
that will impose constraints on what SAC should look like. The need to
develop a strategy for SAC is also perceived by the automotive companies
as an opportunity to improve their cybersecurity development process.
As such, the question also takes up the internal drivers related to this
aspect.
RQ2: What are the gaps in the state of the art when it comes to the industrial
applicability of SAC?
This question aims at identifying gaps in the state of the art with respect to
the needs of companies in the automotive domain from two perspectives:
• Approaches for the creation of SAC
• Support to assist practitioner in creating SAC
RQ3: How can an approach for the construction of security assurance cases
fulfill the needs of the automotive domain?
The purpose of this question is to investigate how an approach for SAC
creation can be built in order to fulfill both the external and internal needs
of automotive companies, as well as closing the gaps between research
and the industrial needs for SAC adoption.
1.2 Context and related work
In this section, we provide a background about security assurance cases, as
well as a review of related work.
1.2.1 Security Assurance Cases
Assurance cases are defined by the GSN standard [3] as “A reasoned and
compelling argument, supported by a body of evidence, that a system, service
or organisation will operate as intended for a defined application in a defined
environment.”
Assurance cases can be documented in either textual or graphical forms.
Figure 1.1 depicts an example of what an assurance case documented using
the GSN notation looks like. The case in the example is a part of a larger case
for a supermarket system.
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Top claim: 
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system is acceptably secure
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Figure 1.1: An example of a security assurance case
Assurance cases consist of two main parts: the argument and the evidence.
The case in the figure consists of the following nodes: claim (also called goal),
context, strategy, assumption (also called justification), and evidence (also
called solution). At the top of the case, there is usually a high level claim,
which is broken down to sub-claims based on certain strategies. The claims
specify the goals we want to assure in the case, e.g., that a certain property is
preserved. An example of a strategy is to break down a claim based on the
information assets of the system as shown in Strategy 1 in Figure 1.1. Claims
are broken down iteratively they reach a point where evidence can be assigned
to justify them. Examples of evidence are test results, monitoring reports,
and code review reports. The assumptions made while applying the strategies,
e.g., that all relevant threats have been identified, are made explicit using the
assumption nodes. Finally, the scope of a claim is set using the context nodes.
An example of a context is the definition of an acceptably secure system.
Assurance cases have been widely used for safety-critical systems in multiple
domains [4]. An example is the automotive industry, where safety cases have
been used for demonstrating compliance with the functional safety standard
ISO 26262 [2, 5, 6]. Another example is the medical domain, where safety cases
where used to assure the safety of medical devices [7]. However, there is an
increasing interest in using these cases for security as well. For instance, the
upcoming automotive standard ISO 21434 [1] explicitly requires the creation
of cyber-security arguments. SAC are a special type of assurance cases where
the claims are about the security of the system in question, and the body of
evidence justifies the security claims.
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1.2.2 Related work
In this section, we present the related work to the main contribution of this
thesis, CASCADE. It is an asset-driven approach for creating SAC with built-
in quality assurance, inspired by ISO/SAE-21434 standard for cybersecurity
in automotive. Hence, we introduce the main papers which use assets as
argumentation strategies, are based on security standards, or are conducted in
the automotive domain.
1.2.2.1 Asset-based approaches
Assets are artefacts of value to a certain organization, project, or system.
Researchers have been exploring several asset-based approaches for creating the
argument part of SAC. These approaches use assets and their decomposition
as strategies to break down claims in SAC.
Biao et al. [8] suggest dividing the argument into different layers, and
using different patterns (one per layer) to create the part of the argument that
corresponds to each layer. Assets are considered as one of these layers, and the
pattern used to create it includes claims that the assets are “under protection”,
and strategies to break down critical assets. In contrast to our work, Biao et
al. [8], however, do not consider the quality of the cases and only focus on
creating arguments without touching upon the evidence part.
Luburic et al. [9] also present an asset-based approach for security assurance.
The info used in their approach is taken from: (i) asset inventories; (ii) Data
Flow Diagrams (DFD) of particular assets and the components that manipulate
them; and (iii) the security policy that defines protective mechanisms for the
components from the previous point. They propose a domain model where
assets are the center pieces. The assets are linked to security goals. The
argument considers the protection of the assets throughout their life-cycles by
arguing about protecting the components that store, process, and transmit those
assets. The SAC they provide is very high level and includes two strategies:
“reasonable protection for all sensitive assets” and arguing over the data-flow of
each related component. The authors illustrate the approach with a conference
management system example. They state that the main limitations of their
are asset and data flow granularity. In our work, we also consider the assets
to be the driver of our approach, but we extend the argument to reach the
level of concrete security requirements. We also derive our strategies from an
industrial standard and validate our approach in collaboration with an OEM.
Furthermore, we extend our approach to include case quality aspects.
1.2.2.2 Standard-based approaches
Using standards to extract requirements for creating the arguments of SAC
has been done in multiple studies. However, none of these studies targets the
upcoming standard ISO/SAE-21434 for cybersecurity in automotive. Finnegan
et al [10,11] present a security case framework for the area of medical device
security assurance. Their framework incorporates multiple standards and best
practice documents as a guidance to develop a security argument pattern. The
pattern provides a “comprehensive matrix showing the link between the security
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risks, associated causes, the mitigating security controls and evidence of those
controls being implemented to establish the security capability.”
Ankrum et al. [12] studied how requirements from standards in safety-
critical domains can be mapped to assurance cases using the most common
notations for documenting assurance cases Goal Structuring Notation (GSN)
and ASCAD (Claims – Arguments – Evidence). One of the standards used
in the study was the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, ISO/IEC 15408:1999 [13], and the researchers describe challenges
they encountered while conducting the mapping and lessons learned.
In our work, we have used the upcoming ISO/SAE 21434 standard to
structure an approach for creating SAC, but also considered the industrial
needs from the automotive domain.
1.2.2.3 Studies in automotive
Few studies about SAC have been conducted or evaluated in the automotive
domain. Cheah et al. [14] in their study “Building an automotive security
assurance case using systematic security evaluation” review security engineer-
ing in the automotive industry, and the challenges to introducing a security
engineering process in this domain, e.g., the overhead required to establish a
security mechanism in general, and the diversity of the vehicles with many
Parameters and configurations. The authors presents a classification approach
of security test results using security severity ratings. This classification can be
included in the security evaluation, which may according to the study be used
to improve the selection of future test cases, as well as evidence when creating
security assurance cases. The paper includes two case studies that demonstrate
the method. The first case was done with a Bluetooth connection to the
infotainment system of a vehicle, and the second was done on an aftermarket
diagnostics tool. The results of both studies are severity rated evidences which
could be used to prioritize countermeasure development, and to add evidence
to security assurance cases. No security assurance case is actually created,
but rather severity rated evidences which the authors claim can be used in a
security assurance case.
1.3 Methodology
This section summarizes the research methodology applied to answer the
research questions of this thesis. RQ1 was answered through qualitative
research methods. RQ2 was addressed using a systematic literature review and
RQ3 was answered using the Design Science Research methodology.
1.3.1 Qualitative research methods
We used various qualitative research methods in Paper A to answer the first
research question “What are the drivers for working with security assurance
cases in the automotive domain?”, as shown in Figure 1.2. These include a
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Figure 1.2: Qualitative research methods – Paper A
as internal needs was contributed by the author of this thesis, while the external
needs part was contributed by co-authors of Paper A.
1.3.1.1 Workshop
We conducted a workshop at a large automotive OEM to elicit usage scenarios
related to SAC. We invited stakeholders from different backgrounds and different
parts of the organization. We had 12 participants and three moderators
contributing. We divided the participants into three groups of 4, making sure
to spread similar roles and competences among the groups. E.g., we had three
participant who were familiar with safety cases, so we assigned them to different
groups. We asked the groups to brainstorm for 45 minutes on usage scenarios
for security assurance cases, and to describe them as user stories, like “As a
«role» I would use security assurance cases for «usage»” [15]. Each user story
corresponds to one usage scenario. We explicitly asked the participants to come
up with real-life scenarios in the context of their company. The participants
shared their usage scenarios on a whiteboard, and we compiled a set of distinct
scenarios as an outcome of this step and an input to the next step.
1.3.1.2 Prioritization and interviews
At this step, we wanted to dig deeper and get a better understanding of the
most important scenarios. We also wanted to acquire the point of view of
more diverse stakeholders. Hence we had to prioritize the usage scenarios and
identify stakeholders to be interviewed for the top ones.
Concerning the prioritization, we aimed at getting expert opinions on which
usage scenarios are of most value to the company, from a security perspective.
We sent out the scenarios collected from the workshop to 10 security experts
from an automotive OEM, and asked them to select the top five scenarios by
assigning a rank from 1 to 5 to them, where 5 is assigned to the most valuable
scenario for the company.
Afterwards, we selected the top five usage scenarios and identified a key
stakeholder for each. Finally, we conducted in-person interviews with these
stakeholders to gain a deeper understanding of the usage scenarios. The
interviewees were selected based on the relevance of their expertise to the actors
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of the user stories in the corresponding usage scenarios. For example, the actor
of one of our top usage scenarios is a legal risk owner. Hence, we selected an
interviewee who has extensive experience in law and has the role senior legal
counsel in the company.
We organized each interview into four parts, according to the following
themes:
i Value In the first part, we focus on the value that SAC might bring to
the stakeholder in terms of, e.g., efficiency, and quality management. The
objective of the discussion is to picture the ‘status quo’ (e.g., to understand
how the level of security is currently appraised) and the expectations (i.e.,
how things should improve).
ii Content and structure The focus of this part is to get the interviewees’
technical opinions on how the content and structure of SAC should be, e.g.,
in terms of level of detail and types of claims.
iii Integration This part is about understanding how SAC could be integrated
with the current way of working, and whether it could fit in the current
activities, or would require modifications to the process.
iv Challenges and opportunities The last part of the interview is about
understanding the challenges and opportunities that the stakeholders foresee
in applying SAC.
In each interview, there was an interviewer, an interviewee, and a security
expert who acted as a discussion enabler. We recorded the interviews, and
used the recordings to extract a transcript for each interview. To analyze the
data, we used deductive coding using codes corresponding to our predefined
themes. The analyzed data was then sent to the corresponding interviewees
for validation and additional comments.
1.3.1.3 Analysis of documents
To gain an understanding of the external drivers of SAC work, a knowledge
base of documents relevant to cybersecurity, which was created and maintained
by an industrial partner was used. This knowledge base consist of standards,
regulations, guidelines, best practices, etc applicable for various markets, and
includes, among other things, information regarding the categorization of
requirements, their relevance, the parts of the organization that is affected,
and which life-cycle phases of the products are impacted. Co-authors of Paper
A analyzed the documents for explicit references to security assurance cases
or their parts. They also looked for implicit relationships to SAC, e.g., when
the documents include requirements of processes for identification, assessment
and mitigation of vulnerabilities. An SAC can then be used to show how this
requirement is fulfilled listing the demanded processes and the evidence for
them.
1.3.2 Systematic Literature Review(SLR)
Systematic Literature Reviews (SLR) are conducted to collect and analyze
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Figure 1.3: Systematic Literature Review steps – Paper B
Paper B to gain an understanding of existing work in security assurance. In
particular, we looked for approaches for creating security assurance cases and
evidence concerning their validity, support to facilitate the adoption of SAC,
and rationale to support the adoption of SAC. We followed the guidelines
introduced by Kitchenham et al. [16], and conducted the study in six steps as
depicted in Figure 1.3.
In the first step, we carefully constructed the assessment criteria for each
of our research questions and the inclusion/exclusion criteria for the retrieved
papers. This was done in a series of brainstorming sessions including the three
authors of the study.
The second step was creating the search string. In order to maximize the
chance of obtaining all relevant papers in the field we familiarized ourselves with
the specific terminology used by researchers in the field of security assurance.
This was done by conducting a manual search for papers related to security
assurance cases that were published in the past five years in multiple venues
with high visibility in the security domain. We executed the query on three
libraries (IEEE Xplore, ACM Digital Library,and Scopus) and got a total of
8440 results.
In the next step, we applied the inclusion/exclusion criteria on the results
in three filtration rounds. In the first one, we filtered based on the title and
keywords, which reduced the number of included studies to 211. In the second
filtering round, we applied the inclusion and exclusion criteria to the abstracts
and conclusions of the 211 remaining studies. After this step, the number
of studies was reduced to 49. In the last filtering round, we fully read the
remaining 49 papers, applied the inclusion and exclusion criteria on the whole
text, and ended up with 44 included studies. We also looked at the references
in the included papers and performed backward snowballing [17]. In this step,
we did not restrict the search to only peer-reviewed studies in order to allow for
potential gray literature to be included. This resulted in including additional 7
papers (including 2 technical reports) in our review.
Finally, we analyzed the 51 included studies based on our defined assessment
criteria to answer our research questions.
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Figure 1.4: Two-iteration Design Science Research – Paper C
1.3.3 Design Science Research (DSR)
Design science research is a problem-solving methodology, which aims at
developing artefacts to extend existing boundaries in a given context [18]. In
paper C, we conducted two research iterations, following the design science
guidelines proposed by Hevner et al. [18] and the five-step process proposed by
Vaishnavi and Kuechler [19], which consists of the awareness of the problem,
suggestion, development, evaluation and conclusion steps. The two-iteration
process is depicted in Figure 1.4.
The first iteration, initiation, aimed at addressing the needs for security
assurance cases which were identified in Paper A. Specifically, we aimed at
investigating an asset-based approach for the creation of security assurance
cases, in order to assist automotive companies to fulfill their needs to conform
with the upcoming ISO/SAE-21434 standard. We suggested an initial asset-
based approach and used an online case for a supermarket system [20] to
illustrate the outcome of the approach. The approach and the outcome of the
illustration were discussed with security experts at two large automotive OEMs.
The main input from the companies was focused on the need to align the
structure of the approach with the internal way of working at the companies,
which is also one of the internal needs identified in Paper A. Another aspect of
improvement that emerged from the evaluation of the initiation iteration is the
need for a mechanism to assure the quality of the approach’s outcome.
In the second iteration improvement, we aimed at improving the artefact
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(asset-based approach) by incorporating the experience gathered in the first
iteration. We created CASCADE, an asset-based approach for SAC creation
with built-in quality assurance. The structure of CASCADE is inspired by the
requirements and work products of ISO/SAE-21434, and takes into consider-
ation the need to quality assure the outcome, as well as the way of working
at the automotive companies we consulted in the first iteration. To evalu-
ate CASCADE, we applied it on an example case of a headlamp item from
ISO/SAE-21434, and presented the outcome to security experts at an OEM.
As a conclusion, we identified areas for future enhancement of CASCADE to
fulfill a wider range of the internal needs of the company.
1.4 Contributions
In this section, we provide a summary of the main contributions of each paper
towards answering our research questions.
1.4.1 RQ1: What are the drivers for working with secu-
rity assurance cases in the automotive domain?
To answer this research question we conducted the study presented in Paper A.
We investigated the internal drivers of SAC work in automotive and contextu-
alized the results based on the external drivers which were identified by our
co-authors, as explained in Section 1.3.1.3
Our results clearly indicate potential value of using SAC at the company.
They show that SAC can be used by a variety of stakeholders, e.g., product
owners and compliance team members, for a variety of purposes, e.g., quality
assessment and communication with suppliers, in all the phases of an automotive
product’s life-cycle, e.g., design and development.
1.4.1.1 Internal drivers of SAC in the automotive industry
What drives the SAC work in an automotive company is the value the cases
can bring to people in different roles in the company. Hence, we identified
13 usage scenarios for SAC in an automotive company. We also prioritized
these usage scenarios based on the potential added value to the company, and
identified the top 5 scenarios, which are shown in Table 1.1
To gain a better understanding of the usage scenarios, we conducted inter-
views with corresponding roles and as a result, we extracted a set of drivers for
companies wanting to adopt SAC in their work, as shown in Table 1.2.
1.4.2 RQ2: What are the gaps in the state of the art
when it comes to the industrial applicability of SAC?
To answer this question, we need to know what the industrial needs are,
which is covered in Paper A. Additionally, we need to know what exist in
literature, and accordingly, we can identify the gaps. Paper B contributes
with a Systematic Literature Review in which multiple research questions
regarding the applicability of SAC in industry are studied. Specifically, we
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Table 1.1: Top 5 usage scenarios identified at an automotive company
US 2 As a member of the compliance team, I would use detailed SAC
to prove to authorities that the company has complied to a
certain standard, legislation, etc., and show them evidence of my
claim of compliance.
US 6 As a product owner, I would use SAC to make an assessment of
the quality of my product from a security perspective, and make a
road-map for future security development.
US 12 As a legal risk owner, I would use SAC in court if a legal case is
raised against the company for security related issues. I would use
the SAC to prove that sufficient preventive actions were taken.
US 8 As a member of the purchase team, I would include SAC as a part
of the contracts made with suppliers, in order to have evidence of
the fulfillment of security requirements at delivery time, and to
track progress during development time.
US 3 As a project manager, I would use SAC to make sure that a
project is ready from a security point of view to be closed and
shipped to production.
studied the motivations for creating and using SAC as reported in literature.
We also studied different reported approaches for SAC creation, as well as
their validations. Lastly, we studied the reported support for SAC creation as
reported in literature.
1.4.2.1 Wide variety of approaches, but not enough to cover indus-
trial needs
The literature includes a rich variety of studies which explore approaches for
creating SAC, especially when it comes to the argumentation part. However,
theses approaches do not consider the specific needs of companies in a specific
industry, e.g., automotive.
The variety in approaches gives organizations the possibility to choose
those that fit their way of working and the security artefacts they produce.
For example, a company that works according to an agile methodology could
choose to adopt an SAC approach for iterative development [21]. However, this
choice has to consider constraints of the applicability of the approach, including
benefits and challenges of its adoption, e.g., the impact on the the way of
working. These aspects are not discussed in the literature and the burden is
left to the adopter.
Another example is the question of conformance with different standards.
While this has been discussed in literature, there is a lack of studies which
systematically assess different approaches based on their ability to help achieving
conformance with a certain standard. To generalize this, we observed that there
is a lack of studies which compare different approaches in different contexts.
In consequence, from an industrial perspective, organizations need to select
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Table 1.2: Drivers of SAC work in automotive companies
Driver Description
The importance to cover
both product and process to
comply with regulations and
standards
Several of the security-related
standards/regulations contain both requirements
on processes and the product. The processes
include how to develop the product in a secure
manner as well as keeping the product secure
after its release.
The need for SAC on whole
products over sub-projects
In industries producing complex products, e.g.,
automotive, it is common that the products are
organized in multiple projects. Additionally, the
changes to these products are also done using
projects (commonly called delta projects). In this
case, SAC should be created on a product level
rather than a project level.
Essential that SAC work
follows the development
process
It is possible to build SAC for existing products,
but going forward, it is important to embed the
work on SAC into the development process at the
organization
The need to actively assess
the quality of SAC
SAC are going to serve multiple purposes within
the organization with different levels of criticality.
Therefore, it must be clear what the quality level
of each SAC is, so that they are not used in the
wrong context.
A common language is key
to smooth collaboration
with suppliers
When it comes to working with suppliers, the
SAC should be built using an exchangeable
format. This is to enable the SAC created by the
suppliers to be integrated with the SAC of the
corresponding product.
The importance to plan for
shared ownership with
suppliers
The suppliers might require to keep parts of the
SAC private (e.g., some evidence). In this case, it
is important to have a mechanism to keep
ensuring the overall quality of the SAC, e.g., by
introducing a black-box with meta-information.
Additionally, the ownership of the whole case has
to be considered, as the complete SAC would not
be in the hands of a single stakeholder.
The challenging nature of
working with SAC
Working with SAC is not trivial and comes with
many challenges. Traceability and change analysis
were considered main challenges by the majority
of the participants. Additionally, finding the right
competences to carry out the SAC-related work,
role identification and description, and acquiring
the right tools and integrating them in the
organizations tool chain were also considered
major challenges.
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suitable approaches in an exploratory way, which can be highly time and
resource consuming.
The studies presenting new approaches also lack the discussion of the
granularity level that is possible or required to achieve using each approach.
We believe that future studies should take into consideration the possible usages
for SAC created using different approaches, and discuss the required granularity
level based on that. For example, would an SAC created through the security
assurance-driven software development approach [22] be useful to companies
which outsource parts of their development work to providers? In that case,
on which level should these cases be created, e.g., on the feature level or on
the level of the complete product?
1.4.2.2 Lack of quality assurance
Quality assurance is the weaker part of the literature reviewed in Paper B.
We talk here about three main things. First is the quality of the outcomes
when it comes to their applicability in practice. We have seen scarcity of
industrial involvement. The reason might be a lack of interest, which contradict
the reported motivations and usage scenarios, or simply because it is hard
to get relevant data from industrial companies to validate the outcomes, as
security-related data is considered to be sensitive (as we mentioned earlier).
Furthermore, with the exception of a few cases, the creation and validation
of SAC in literature is done by the authors of the studies. We believe that
this contributes heavily to the lack of information addressing challenges and
drawbacks of applying SAC in a practical context.
The second issue is the generalizability of the approaches with regards to
the used argumentation strategies. The approaches we reviewed use a wide
variety of argumentation strategies, e.g., based on threat analysis, requirements,
or risk analysis. However, they lack validations and critical discussions as to
whether the approaches work only with the used strategies or can use other
strategies as well. We suggest to validate these approaches based on different
types of strategies in future research.
The last point is the lack of mechanisms for including quality assurance
within the SAC. We learned in RQ1 that it is essential for the argumentation
provided in SAC to be complete in order for them to be useful. For that there
needs to be a mechanism to actively assess the quality of the arguments to gain
confidence in them. This is not addressed in literature apart from a few studies
where it has been partially addressed, e.g., [23–25]. Similarly, the evidence part
also needs to be assessed. e.g., by introducing metrics to assess the extension to
which a certain evidence justifies the claim it is assigned to. The inter-relation
between claims and evidence needs to be addressed to assess whether a claim
is fully justified by the assigned evidence or not.
1.4.2.3 Imbalance in coverage
Multiple needs and drivers, e.g., managing working with suppliers, quality
assurance of SAC, and organization-related issues are not covered in literature.
This indicates a weakness in the approaches, as elements of SAC cannot be
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evaluated in silos. For example, if we take an approach to create security argu-
ments, how would we know which evidence to associate with these? Moreover,
we will not be able to assess whether we actually reach an acceptable level of
granularity for the claims to be justified by evidence. The same thing applies to
the evidence part. If we only look at the evidence we will not be able to know
which claims the suggested evidence can help justify. To be able to evaluate
the evidence, they have to be put in context with the rest of the SAC. When
reviewing the studies that focus on one element of SAC, we were not able to
find any links to related studies focusing on the remaining elements, which
indicates incompleteness of the approaches.
When it comes to other areas, the assessment and quality assurance of SAC
is rarely covered, as we discussed in the previous sub-section. Furthermore,
there is a lack of studies covering what comes after the creation of SAC. In
particular, for SAC to be useful, they have to be updated and maintained
throughout the life-cycles of the products and systems they target. Otherwise,
they become obsolete, according to what we learned in Paper A. Particularly,
there need to be traceability links between the created SAC and the artefacts of
these products and systems. Many SAC approaches use GSN, which allows to
reference external artefacts using the context and assumption nodes. However,
these nodes are rarely exploited in the examples provided in the studies we
reviewed. Moreover, there is a lack of studies targeting the organizational
aspects of working with SAC, e.g., the ownership of SAC and how to handle
sub-cases when working with suppliers.
1.4.3 RQ3: How can an approach for the construction
of security assurance cases fulfill the needs of the
automotive domain?
The three papers included in this thesis contribute towards answering RQ3.
We built on the gained knowledge when answering RQ1 and RQ2 to create an
approach for SAC creation. The approach CASCADE is the main contribution
of Paper C. It is an asset-driven approach with built-in quality assurance.
1.4.3.1 Design goals of CASCADE
CASCADE is inspired by the upcoming standard for cybersecurity in automo-
tive SAE/ISO-21434 [1]. Conformance with this standard has been identified
as one of the most important drivers for SAC work in Paper A, and it has not
been covered in any of the papers included in the SLR of Paper B. CASCADE
was designed to achieve the following goals:
• Make assets the driving force of the SAC to allow creating security
assurance based on what is valuable in the system.
• Embed quality assurance in the approach to make sure the outcome
satisfies the desired quality by the adopting entity.
• Divide the approach into different layers and blocks, so that different
people can work on them in different development phases.
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• Enable re-usability and scalability to prevent overhead and work repetition
while creating SAC on lower-level items.
1.4.3.2 Structure of the approach
CASCADE consists of blocks which correspond to the requirements and work
products of SAE/ISO-21434. Figure 1.5 shows these blocks.
Level 1: Risk assessment
Level 2: Attack paths
Level 1: Threat scenarios
Level 2: Security goals
Level 1: Asset identification and decomposition
Top Claim
















Figure 1.5: The CASCADE approach for creating security assurance cases
Top Claim consists of the top security claim of the artefact in question. It
also includes the context of the claim and assumptions made to set the scope
of the claim.
Generic sub-case helps achieve the goal of preserving re-usability and
scalability. It contains a sub-case that is applicable not only to the artefact for
which the SAC is being created, but instead to a larger context. For example,
if a company defines a cybersecurity policy, enforced by cybersecurity rules and
processes, then the policy can be used in security claims for all its products.
White-hat This block starts with the identification of assets, which is the
driver of our approach, as per our design goals. Asset identification is done
by conducting an analysis to find the artefacts of the system that are likely
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to be subject to an attack. To link the assets to the main claim, we identify
which assets exist and which components use or have access to these assets. To
decompose assets, we look into the types of the identified assets. This gives an
indication whether the asset would have implications on the local part of the
vehicle (one electronic control unit/ECU), or on a bigger part of the vehicle
(multiple ECUs).
We also look into the relations among assets, e.g., dependability. To link
the asset to the lower level in the approach, i.e., the security goals, we identify
the relevant security properties for the assets. Specifically, we look into the
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA) triad. When we have identified
the relevant security properties for each asset, we create claims representing
the security goals1.
Black-hat In this block, we aim to identify the scenarios that might lead to
not fulfilling the identified security goals and hence cause harm to our identified
assets. When we have identified the claims about the achievement of security
goals, we proceed by identifying the threat scenarios and creating claims for
negating the possibility of these scenarios. We connect these claims to the
corresponding claims about achieving security goals. We then identify possible
attack paths which can lead to the realization of a threat scenario. Each threat
scenario might be associated with multiple attack paths. We then claim the
opposite of these attack paths.
Resolver This block is the last one in the argumentation part of the CAS-
CADE approach. It links the claims derived from the attack paths to the
evidence. In this level, we assess the risk of the identified attack paths. Based
on the risk level, the creators of the SAC create claims to treat the risk by, e.g.,
accepting, mitigating, or transferring it.
Requirements At this point, requirements of risk treatments identified in
the previous level are to be expressed as claims. This level may contain multiple
decomposition of claims, based on the level of detail the creators of the SAC
wish to achieve, which is driven by the potential usage of the SAC. For instance,
if the SAC is to be used by a development team to assess the security level,
this might require a fine grained requirement decomposition which might go all
the way to the code level. In contrast, if the SAC is to be used to communicate
security issues with outside parties, a higher level of granularity might be
chosen. In either case, it is important to reach an “actionable” level, meaning
that the claims should reach a point where evidence can be assigned to justify
them.
Evidence The evidence is a crucial part of an SAC. The quality of the
argument does not matter if it cannot be justified by evidence. In our approach,
evidence can be provided at any block of the argumentation. For example,
if it can be proven in the black-hat block that a certain asset is not subject
to any threat scenario, then evidence can be provided and the corresponding
1A security goal is preserving a security concern (CIA) for an asset [26]
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claims can be considered as justified. If the creators of the SAC cannot assign
evidence to claims, this is an indication that either the argument did not reach
an actionable point or that there is a need to go back and make development
changes to satisfy the claims. For example, if we reach a claim which is not
covered by any test report, then there might be a need to create test cases to
cover that claim.
Case Quality Assurance assists the achievement of our design goal to
embed quality assurance in CASCADE. We consider two main aspects of
quality assurance for SAC. The first aspect is completeness which refers to
the level of coverage of the claims in each argumentation level of the SAC.
Each level in CASCADE includes at least one strategy. For each strategy, we
add at least one completeness claim that refines it. The role of this claim
is to make sure that the strategy covers all and only the relevant claims on
the argumentation level. The completeness also relates to the context of
the argumentation strategy. The context provides the information needed to
determine if the completeness claim is fulfilled or not.
The second aspect is confidence which indicates the level of certainty that
a claim is fulfilled based on the provided evidence. This is used in each level of
a security assurance case where at least one claim is justified by evidence. The
confidence aspect is expressed as a claim, which takes the form: “The evidence
provided for claim X achieves an acceptable level of confidence”. What makes
an acceptable level of confidence is defined in the context of the strategy. The
confidence claim itself must be justified by evidence.
1.4.3.3 Evaluation of CASCADE
In order to evaluate CASCADE, we collaborated with a security expert from the
cybersecurity team at Volvo Trucks, which is a leading OEM that manufactures
trucks in Sweden. We conducted several sessions during the development
of CASCADE where we discussed the approach, its limitations and possible
enhancements. When the approach was fully developed, we conducted a
final evaluation session with the expert. We used the headlamp example
from ISO/SAE-21434 as a context for this discussion. We then presented our
approach and the example case for the headlamp item. The expert evaluated
the approach by discussing what the overall structure of an SAC should look
like from the company’s perspective in order to satisfy the requirement for
security cases in ISO/SAE-21434 and mapping the different elements of the
example case to the internal way of working. The expert also provided insights
on how to further enhance the approach.
Figure 1.6 shows the different security activities at the company along with
the corresponding CASCADE block. A link between an activity and a block
indicates that the outcomes of the activity are used to create the SAC elements
in the corresponding block. As shown in the figure, CASCADE aligns well
with the way of working at the company.




















Figure 1.6: Mapping of the company’s security activities to CASCADE blocks
1.5 Threats to validity
In this thesis, we consider the internal and external categories of validity threats
as defined in [27], and described in [16,28].
In terms of external validity, we are aware that the general validity of our
results in Paper A and Paper C could be limited to the companies involved
in the study. Also, the companies are from the same country. Therefore,
the results might not directly translate to companies with a different culture.
However, the involved companies are of high profile, quite large and compete
at the international level. Therefore, they are able to provide a quite broad
perspective on the entire automotive industry. In any case, the results presented
in this paper are an important first important step towards a larger survey
study involving more companies and professionals, internationally.
In terms of internal validity we consider several aspects. In the the prioriti-
zation of the usage scenarios in Paper A, there is a risk that the selection of the
top scenarios was biased by present market pressure towards compliance to the
upcoming standards. Another limitation is the selection of the participants of
the workshop and interviews of Paper A as well as the evaluation of Paper C, as
it was based on expertise and availability (convenience sampling). However, In
Paper A, we have a balance mix of participants with different types of expertise:
security, product development, business, and legal, and in Paper C we have
an experienced security expert. This provides us with enough confidence that
the results are representative of the expectations and needs across the studied
companies.
The work of conducting the SLR in Paper B was done by one researcher.
This means that applying the inclusion / exclusion criteria in each of the four
filtering rounds was done by one person. This imposes a risk of subjectivity,
as well as a risk of missing results, which might have affected the internal
validity of this study. To mitigate this, a preliminary list of known good papers
was manually created and used for a sanity check of the selected and included
papers. Additionally, a quality control was performed periodically by the other
authors to check the included and excluded studies.
Another threat to validity in the SLR is publication bias [16]. This is due to
the fact that studies with positive results are more likely to get published than
those with negative results. This could compromise the conclusion validity of
the SLR, as in our case we did not find any study that is, e.g., against using
SAC, or which reported a failed validation of its outcome. In Paper B, we have
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partially mitigated this threat by also including a few technical reports (i.e.,
non peer-reviewed material). These papers have been identified as part of the
snowballing, as we didn’t restrict to peer-reviewed papers.
When it comes to the reliability of the SLR, we believe that any researcher
with access to the used libraries will be able to reproduce the study, and get
similar results plus additional results for the studies which get published after
the work of the SLR is done.
In Paper C, we used an example from ISO/SAE-21434 to illustrate CAS-
CADE. However, there is a risk that the example does not represent actual
cases from industry. We believe that the structure of the example case is what
is important for the evaluation rather than the actual content, as discussed
and confirmed by the security expert who ran the evaluation at the OEM.
1.6 Conclusion
In this work, we have created CASCADE, an asset-driven approach for the
creation of security assurance cases with built in quality assurance. CASCADE
was inspired by the structure of the upcoming ISO/SAE-21434 standard for
cybersecurity in automotive. We have identified the drivers of security as-
surance case work in the automotive industry by investigating and analyzing
requirements and usage scenarios for these cases in the industry. We have also
systematically reviewed literature of SAC and identified gaps between what is
available in literature and what the industry needs. We utilized what we learned
from the industry and the gaps we found in literature to design CASCADE. We
evaluated this approach with a security expert at a large automotive OEM. An
example case available in ISO/SAE-21434 was used to illustrate the approach,
and the evaluation showed that the cyber-security activities at the company
aligns well with the structure of CASCADE.
1.7 Future work
In this section, we discuss the future work, which will build on the findings of
this thesis to achieve the overall goal of my PhD thesis, as discussed in Section
1.1.
Further development of CASCADE CASCADE has been designed to
close gaps between literature and industrial needs when it comes to adopting
SAC. We will continue to develop CASCADE to further close these gaps. In
particular, we the future development will target:
• The maintenance of SAC, i.e., how to enable updating the cases following
changes that are made to the system in question or to the artefacts used
to build the case using traceability links.
• Organizational matters, i.e., how the work in SAC would affect the day
to day work in an automotive company, and what impact it would have
on the enterprise architecture of these companies.
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• Work on the evidence part of SAC. In particular, we want to study the
available evidence in automotive companies and assess what support is
needed to continuously updated them in the SAC.
• CASCADE was inspired by the structure and requirements and work
products of SAE/ISO-21434. However, there are other regulations and
standards which require SAC, as we have seen in Paper A. We plan to
study these requirements and reflect them in the structure of CASCADE.
Evaluation of CASCADE To assess CASCADE, we plan to evaluate it by
including a larger community of automotive companies and security experts.
The plan to base the evaluation on the eventual added value of CASCADE to
the company. Additionally, we plan to study the application of CASCADE
in other safety-critical domains, e.g., the medical domain, which includes
different organizational structures to the automotive companies which we have
been targeting. Moreover, we plan to reach out to stakeholders in the software
engineering domain, e.g., architects with a questionnaire to evaluate CASCADE.
This is mainly to eliminate the potential bias to the companies we collaborate
with.
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